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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of the
treatment of comparative advertising in Argentina‘s courts.**
Argentina lacked, and still lacks, a statute that specifically
regulates the subject matter. Therefore, courts are forced to apply
norms about trademark law,1 fair trade rules,2 self-regulatory
advertising,3 and unfair competition4 in order to establish the legal
boundaries for comparisons of products or services provided by a
competitor.
In the last four decades, more than fifteen decisions have
progressively permitted comparisons of products, established clear
standards and abandonded the strict rule that the mere mention of
another brand constituted trademark infringement.5 The aim of
this paper is to expose which ideas and legal principles Argentine
judges have begun to embrace in order to facilitate and clarify the
legality of product comparisons in the competitive advertising
process.
I. EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINA‘S CASE LAW
What follows is an analysis of the most important comparative
advertising cases decided in Argentina.6
**

This article was originally written in Spanish and was translated by staff and editors
of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for the
purposes of publication. The quoted material has all been translated into English.
1
See Law No. 22.362, Dec. 26, 1980 (Arg.), available at http://www.wipo.int
/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=209924 (―Law on Trademarks and Designations‖).
2
See Law No. 22.802, May 19, 1983 (Arg.), available at http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=224922 (―Fair Trade Law‖).
3
See Code of Ethics and Self-Advertising, CONARP, http://www.conarp.org.ar/
codigo.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
4
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10, Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1583; CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 953 (Arg.) (applied by courts due to lack of a general
law on unfair competition).
5
In some cases, the mere inference of a trademark, without even mentioning it, was
considered trademark infringement.
6
Due to a lack of space, it is not possible to comment on all the relevant cases, but it
is fitting to clarify that many were preventive measures where the issue of comparative
advertising was considered extensively, or where the arguments were more factual than
legal, or where general concepts on the subject matter were repeated without deepening
or establishing new ideas. Therefore, I have excluded these cases from my analysis, only
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A. Relojes Rolex Argentina v. Orient
This case pitted Rolex against Orient regarding an
advertisement made for the watch ―Orient‖ which used the name,
brand, emblem, and photograph of the well-known watch
briefly mentioning and summarizing them in the conclusion so readers can extend their
research if they so wish. These cases are: Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y
Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and
Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 30/06/2005, ―Clorox
Argentina S.A. c. Reckitt Benckiser Argentina S.A. s/medidas cautelares‖ Citar Lexis
(7/15825) (Reckit Benckinser promoted their liquid stain-remover ―Vanish‖ in an
advertisement which stated, ―not with lavandina because it damages cloth,‖ showing a
torn, discolored, and deteriorated tablecloth. The plaintiff promoted its product
―Lavandina Activa‖ as bleach and alleged that the advertisement was disparaging its
trademark and product; the injunction was denied.); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en
lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of
Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2001, ―Japan
Tobacco Inc. y otro c. Massalin Particulares S.A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (2001-E-596) (Arg.)
(the defendant responded to an advertisement using English terms with an advertisement
that contained a humorous tone and mocked the presumed American origin of the
plaintiff‘s cigarettes, which were actually imported from Uruguay; the advertisement did
not constitute unfair competition, nor did it disparage the competitor); Cámara Nacional
de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.]
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1],
19/04/2001, ―Gougenheim S.A. c. Bimbo de Argentina S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina
[J.A.] (2003-I-469) (fleeting use of a competitor‘s trademark in a television commercial;
claim denied in both instances due to lack of trademark use); Cámara Nacional de
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 3 [CNCiv. y Com.]
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 3],
27/9/2000, ―Clorox Argentina S.A. c. Unilever de Argentina S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia
Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-327) (the product CIF from Unilever was compared to Clorox‘s
bleach known as ―Ayudin‖; injunctive relief was originially granted, but revoked on
appeal); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal,
sala 2 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 2], 24/02/2000, ―Unilever de Argentina S.A. c. Procter & Gamble
Interamericas Inc.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-318) (the defendant‘s
advertisement compared the efficiency of Ariel cleaning products and soap in the form of
tablets. There was no mention of the brand of products compared with Ariel. Skip, the
plaintiff‘s product, was the only detergent soap in tablet form; an injunction prohibiting
the commercial was granted); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial
de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 13/6/1996, ―Demibell S.A. c. Deville
S.R.L.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1997-B-67) (Arg.) (a model who had appeared in Demibel
advertisements for several years appeared in a new commercial for competitor Deville,
stating ―. . . now I use Deville . . . .‖ and ―Deville is my new weakness;‖ it was
determined that the advertisement did not constitute unfair competition, nor did it
degrade the competitor).
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―Rolex.‖7 The intent of the advertisement was to introduce the
new watch to the market by implying that it had the same level of
quality as Rolex, while highlighting its lower price and longer
warranty.8 In other words, the advertisement compared Orient to
Rolex. Relojes Rolex Argentina S.A. sued Orient and the
advertising agency for damages allegedly derived from the
advertisement.9
The Court of First Instance rejected the claim.10 While the ad
did not strictly fall under the trademark statute, the court found that
the ad did violate article 953 of the Civil Code, governing unfair
competition.11 However, Rolex was unable to show any proof of
damages because Rolex had neither engaged in a counteradvertising campaign, nor suffered a decrease in the sale of
―Rolex‖ watches, and therefore the unfair competition claim was
dismissed.12 Moreover, Rolex‘s moral damages claim13 was also
rejected because Rolex had not specifically registered its brand or
the use of its watches.14
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling with some
modification.15 For the Court of Appeals, this was an act of
advertising contrary to honest commercial practices and good faith.
The court ruled that, even though the dishonest practice itself did
not generate the right to reparation without proof of damages,
judges should be more lenient on the issue of damages because the

7

Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
2, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 2], 30/12/1971, ―Relojes Rolex Argentina S.A. c. Orient S.A. y otro,‖
Jurisprudencia Argentina Contemporary Section [J.A.] (1972-14).
8
Id. at Part 1.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at Part 2.
12
Id.
13
The term moral damage is commonly used in civil law jurisdictions to ―designate
damage inflicted to interests or assets that are not patrimonial in nature.‖ Saul Litvinoff,
Moral Damages, 38 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977). The typical examples of moral damages are
pain and suffering for libel or slander, or due to identity theft, or reputational damages.
14
Rolex, at Part 2.
15
Id.
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consumer deception is a very subtle element and very difficult to
prove.16 The court concluded that:
[T]he mere act of having carried out comparative
advertising carries the presumption that there is a
damage caused by attracting customers and,
therefore, one should refer to paragraph 165 of the
Procedural Code17 to determine the damages, since
expecting a complete and detailed evaluation of the
amount of damages is quite difficult.18
B. Bodegas Edmundo Navarro Correas v. Agro Industrias
Cartellone
This case arose from a television commercial.
The
advertisement features two glasses in front of various bottles, the
shapes, forms and colors of which signify specific renowned
wines. The plaintiff‘s wine, Navarro Correas pinot noir, is shown,
identifiable only by the shape of its bottle.19 The camera moves
until the two glasses are facing a bottle of Saint Valery (the
defendant‘s wine), and they bow repeatedly, as if welcoming the
new wine.20 The commercial lasts forty-two seconds and aired on
the country‘s most popular channels.21 Navarro Correas sued,
contending that the advertisement was illegal because a bottle
depicting its wine was shown.22 The plaintiff‘s bottle only

16

Id.
The procedural code states that ―when a decision of a judge orders the payment of a
sum of money, interests and damages, the quantity will be established in liquid money or
will at least establish the principals on which the liquidation will take place . . . . The
ruling will determine the amount of the credit or the damages claimed, as long as their
existence is legally checked . . . .‖ CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN
[CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND COMMERICAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 165 (Arg.).
18
Relojes Rolex v. Orient.
19
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 23/3/1991, ―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S. A. c. Agro
Industrias Cartellone S. A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1991-C-531) (Arg.).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
17
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appeared for a fraction of a second and it was impossible to clearly
read the words written on it.23
The court rejected the claim.24 The court held that the use of
the mark was atypical25 and therefore the commercial was legal.26
It also ruled that the plaintiff‘s product was in no way disparaged
and that it was impossible to identify the plaintiff‘s brands when
the advertisement was played at normal speed.27
Judge Perez Delgado‘s opinion in this case created a rule that
transformed the general principle of comparative advertising in
Argentina. He pointed out that:
[O]ne must distinguish between the use of another
brand without authorization as if it is one‘s own
from the mere reference or mention of said brand
recognizing it is another owned brand, since, while
in the first case there will always be an infringement
of trademark rights, in the second it will depend on
the circumstances of each individual case, since the
reference to another brand can constitute a
legitimate action when another‘s ownership is
recognized and that the aim is not about disparaging
or discrediting the other. . . . [T]he mere mention or
evocation of another brand, or even of comparative
advertising, is not in itself forbidden in our legal
system, insofar as the legitimate rights of the
owner28 are not infringed upon. . . . [W]hat the law
seeks to avoid is the exploitation of another brand,
without the owner‘s authorization, to distinguish
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id. The theory of atypical use of a mark was not fully developed at that time. An
atypical use of a tradmark is use that does not fit under the traditional contours of
trademark infringement but can be considered legal or illegal depending on the
circumstances. The theory was fully developed in 1999 with an article written by
Guillermo Cabanellas. See generally Guillermo Cabanellas, El Uso Atípico de Marca
Ajena [Atypical Use of Another’s Trademark] in TEMAS DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL Y DE LA
COMPETENCIA 39–77 (Ernesto Aracama-Zorraquín ed.) (1999) (Arg.).
26
Navarro Correas.
27
Id.
28
Id.
24
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products and services. But these provisions, in my
opinion, do not reach the hypothesis where these
products and services are not identified with another
brand, but instead are only used as a reference to the
already existing products and services, such as the
case we must examine here . . . .29
The judge then continued to clarify that ―none of the owners‘
rights or legitimate interests are breached if another party merely
shows the existence of their brand.‖30 Applying these rules, the
judge watched the commercial and reasoned that there was nothing
degrading about the glasses (representing the consumers) bowing
for the new wine as a sign of welcome, while not bowing towards
other wines. The fleeting appearance, for a fraction of a second, of
the plaintiff‘s wine could not constitute illicit trademark use.31
Judge Farrell joined judge Perez Delgado‘s opinion.32 After
watching the commercial several times—the way a consumer does
(not frame by frame, as was proposed by the dissenting vote)—
Judge Farrell admitted that, although the video can be subject to
different interpretations, there was no denigration of the
competitors‘ wines.33 He stressed that the appearance of a new
wine could involve possible sales that affect the sales of other
wines, impairing them, but clarified that ―this effect on the market
is considered perfectly legal.‖34
Judge Craviotto‘s dissenting vote focused on the distinction
between competitors in the video (whose identities could be
distinguished if watched frame by frame)35 and stated clearly that

29

Id. In subsequent cases, mark-owning plaintiffs will try to prove violation of
trademark law, unfair competition rules and ethical publicity standards to try to
demonstrate that, in the challenged commercial, the line between the mere reference and
explicit use of another person‘s trademark was crossed. Without a doubt, the holding of
this case was a novelty for the trademark practitioner in Argentina who was accustomed
to very few limitations on the property right in a trademark. In contrast to other legal
systems, Argentine law still does not contain clear limitations on trademark rights.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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comparative advertising was generally prohibited in Argentina,
making the advertising in question illegal.36 However, because the
plaintiff could not prove the causal link between the unlawful ad
and the decline in sales, the claim had to be dismissed.37
C. Axoft Argentina v. Megasistemas
Megasistemas controlled the distribution of the software
―Tango,‖ a property of Axoft, in 1989 and 1990.38 When its
commercial relationship with Axoft ended, Megasistemas
published an advertisement during the main information
technology fair in Buenos Aires, reporting that it would thereafter
distribute the software ―Stradivarius,‖ which, according to the ad,
was ―simply superior.‖39

The ad‘s subtitle expressed that in 1990 they had presented
―Tango‖ and that now in 1991, they were introducing

36

Id. The dissent maintained that: ―Comparative advertising is inadmissible in the
present state of legislation—by itself, without injury to the competitor—because what is
being challenged par excellence is the public consumers.‖ Id. Despite its strong words
and intense review of comparative law, the dissent did not cite any written law to defend
this theory. This further highlights the need for more severe regulations.
37
Id.
38
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital,
courtroom 1], 30/12/1993, ―Axoft Argentina Inc. c. Megasistemas, Inc.,‖ La Ley [L.L.]
(1994-C-8) (Arg.).
39
Id.
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―Stradivarius,‖ detailing a list of eighteen services the new
program offered that the previous one lacked.40 In small print, the
advertisement clarified who owned each of the brands.41
Axoft sued, petitioning for cessation of the use of their brand
and publication of the judge‘s decision in the same journal that
published the ad.42 The appellate court accepted the claim.43
Judge Perez Delgado—this time with Judge Craviotto‘s
agreement—recalled his vote in Navarro Correas, but clarified
that the facts were different here.44 His vote emphasized that the
mere mention of another brand was not illegal as there was no
slander, discrediting, or injury to the legitimate trademark right‘s
owner;45 such behavior would have been reprehensible because of
the previous existing relationship between the parties and the
inclusion of a direct comparison to the previous program.46
The court held that the defendant
tried to spread the idea that their product was
superior and had greater range, which in fact made
it a misleading advertisement, since unilaterally and
without the owner‘s consent to the use of the
trademark they split the brand, highlighting only
one of its applications and omitting another
complementary one, that, had it been considered,
would not have helped them to point out the
weaknesses revealed in the advertisement.47

40

Two columns compared the features of each program, such as whether it handled
two currencies, whether it was multiuser, whether it had different ways of dealing with
the different classes of taxes, etc. In each category, Stradivarius had a ―yes‖ while Tango
3.2. always had a ―no.‖ Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
The Court referenced the regular correspondence between the parties, which proved
that various aspects of Tango were omitted (which completed the functions that the
advertisement omitted). Considering that in this case the defendant was the plaintiff‘s
previous distributor and knew the software perfectly well, the omissions of the
comparison were held to be deliberate and in bad faith. Id.
47
Id.
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The court even made a reference to a non-binding statement of
the Commission of Self-Regulating Advertising.48 Addressing the
same ad campaign, this private entity also decided against the
plaintiff, maintaining that the challenged advertisement violated
the Ethical Code of Self-Regulating Advertising and petitioned the
agency that created the advertisement to cancel its airing.
D. Coca Cola v. Pepsi
This case pitted Coca Cola against Pepsi Cola in a comparative
advertising claim involving a public taste-test.49 Pepsi, in its
―Pepsi Challenge‖ campaign, offered street audiences a taste of
each company‘s product—without identifying either—at various
places throughout Buenos Aires.50 The taster revealed his or her
selection by uncovering the bottle of the drink that the consumer
preferred. The survey was recorded and later televised; known
presenter Julian Weich explained the Pepsi Challenge, and then
declared that the public had chosen Pepsi.51

48

Id.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 12/9/1995, ―The Coca Cola Company c. Pepsi Cola Argentina / varios propieded
industrial‖ (Coca Cola IV) La Ley [L.L.] (1995-E-338) (Arg.).
50
Id.
51
Id.
49
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In subsequent commercial, without expressly mentioning Coca
Cola, the same presenter stated: ―due to rules that prohibit
comparative advertising, we will not mention the brand, nor show
the container of our competition. But it doesn‘t matter because
you know which it is . . .‖52 Coca Cola initiated an injunctive
relief action petitioning for the cessation of the Pepsi Challenge.53
The judge in the first instance found himself without
jurisdiction. Instead of a trademark law claim, which would grant
jurisdiction to the federal civil and commercial courts, the judge
ruled that the issue was one of unfair competition because it
focused on the advertising campaign.54 Coca Cola appealed the
decision. The Court of Appeals overturned the decision, finding
that the court had jurisdiction to intervene in the case.55 The Court
of Appeals also decided on the injunctive relief requested, but not
granted, in the lower court.56 The Court of Appeals granted the
request, ―ordering [Pepsi] to immediately cease the advertising
campaign known as Pepsi Challenge,‖ including notices of any
kind, survey stands, and posters.57
In discontinuing the Pepsi Challenge, the court maintained that
Pepsi was conducting a ―masked comparative ad‖ campaign;
although Coca Cola was not expressly mentioned in the campaign,
it obviously referred to Coca Cola, Pepsi‘s only competitor.58 The
campaign had used the brand Coca Cola to garner public support,
―taking advantage of its notoriety, as a way of glorifying, through

52
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
II [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 2], 22/10/93, ―The Coca Cola Company c. Pepsi Cola Argentina‖
(Coca Cola I), La Ley [L.L.] (1994-C-3) (Arg.).
53
See id.
54
Id.
55
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
III [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 3], 01/11/1993, ―The Coca Cola Company y otros‖ (Coca Cola II), La
Ley [L.L.] (1994-C-6) (Arg.).
56
See id. The injunction decision was followed by a recusal motion by Pepsi‘s
lawyers; the recusal was also denied.
57
Coca Cola I.
58
Id. ¶ 10.
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the challenge, the superiority of its own product, in a clear example
of comparative advertising.‖59
In the judges‘ opinion, the case presented an interference with
or use of another party‘s trademark, removing the owner‘s
exclusive control of the commercial image and ownership of the
commercial message.60 The Court twice relied on Rolex v.
Orient61 to illustrate a presumption of damages where, on the
grounds of the second paragraph of Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, a direct or
indirect use of another‘s brand may be illegal and contrary to
honest practice in commercial matters.62
Faced with the injunction, Pepsi appealed to the Supreme
Court.63 The extraordinary appeal was granted, authorizing the
continuation of the campaign. The Supreme Court granted the
appeal because the Court of Appeals had decided on an issue that
had not been decided by the Court of First Instance: the supposed
unlawfulness of the advertisement at hand. On this ground, the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment made by the Court of
Appeals.64
Following the Supreme Court‘s ruling, Pepsi was free to
continue the campaign. When the Pepsi Challenge started again,65
Coca Cola requested another injunction, but was denied by the
Court of First Instance because ―granting the petition for injunction
would imply prior restraint, forbidden by Art. 14 of the National

59

Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 12.
61
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
2, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 2], 30/12/1971, ―Relojes Rolex Argentina S.A. c. Orient S.A. y otro,‖
Jurisprudencia Argentina Contemporary Section [J.A.] (1972-14).
62
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10 bis (2), March 20,
1883 as revised July 14 ,1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (―Any act of competition contrary to
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair
competition.‖).
63
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], 12/9/1995, Coca Cola IV La Ley [L.L.] (1995-E-338) (Arg.).
64
Id.
65
Both companies moved the judicial duel to the media by publishing their
perspectives on the case in the main newspapers of the country.
60
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Constitution.‖66 The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision
without reaching the question of law, stating that the requisites for
an injunction had not been met.67 The Supreme Court denied the
appeal.68
In the meantime, Coca Cola had begun a trademark lawsuit
against Pepsi.69 Coca Cola argued that its trademark was visible
for a fraction of a second. It also argued that the shape of its bottle
was a trademark. Coca Cola petitioned for the definitive cessation
of the advertising campaign and requested that damages be
awarded jointly and severally against Pepsi and the advertising
agency.70
The Court of First Instance denied the claim. The judge
concluded that the use of Coca Cola‘s trademark in this
comparative advertising campaign was legal and that there was no
bad faith in Pepsi‘s campaign;71 the contested conduct was not
unlawful, and therefore the advertising campaign was deemed
legitimate.72
In reaching this conclusion, the judge stated:
It is clear that at no point in time did Pepsi intend to
distinguish its own product from that of the
plaintiff, which is in fact prohibited by law.
Therefore, what is being dealt with here is not the
use of another person‘s trademark but its mention[;]
although it was included, it was a mere insinuation,
66

Art. 14, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (―All the inhabitants of the
Nation are entitled to the following rights, in accordance with the laws that regulate their
exercise, namely: to work and perform any lawful industry; to navigate and trade; to
petition the authorities; to enter, remain in . . . travel through, and leave the Argentine
territory; to publish their ideas through the press without previous censorship; to make
use and dispose of their property; to associate for useful purposes; to profess freely their
religion; to teach and to learn.‖).
67
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
2, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 2], Causa No. 7982, 15/9/1995, ―Coca Cola Co. c. Pepsi Cola‖ (Coca
Cola III) (Arg.).
68
Coca Cola IV.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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since the bottle that presumably belonged to the
plaintiff appeared hidden in the television ads.
However, for that reason in itself, even though it
was not expressly mentioned, the mention is
implicit, since there is no other widely known brew
similar to that of the defendant other than the
plaintiff‘s.73
By applying the holding of the Navarro Correas judgment,74
the judge maintained:
The reference to another person‘s trademark—even
implicitly—is central to comparative advertising,
which forms the basis of the complaint in this
case . . . . But the issue with these types of ads
transcends that which is infringement of trademark
law, which leads to the conclusion that the
campaign being examined by the plaintiffs did not
undergo any unwarranted use of the trademarks
registered by [Coca-Cola]. What drives us to the
heart of the case is the question of whether we are
in the presence of comparative advertising and the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of this type of
advertising.75
Afterwards, the judge cited the principle included in Art. 19 of
the Argentine Constitution that ―no one is obligated to do what the
law does not order.‖ 76 The judge deemed this principle applicable
to legal entities as well as persons. In reviewing the laws
potentially applicable to the case (commercial loyalty, the laws of
unfair competition found in Paris Convention Art.10 bis, and the
73

Id.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 23/3/1991, ―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S. A. c. Agro
Industrias Cartellone S. A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1991-C-531) (Arg.).
75
Coca Cola IV.
76
Art. 19, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (―The private actions of
men which in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are only
reserved to God and are exempted from the authority of judges. No inhabitant of the
Nation shall be obliged to perform what the law does not demand nor deprived of what it
does not prohibit.‖).
74
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Codes of Ethics in Advertising), the judge concluded that ―the socalled comparative advertising is not mala in se nor mala
prohibita.‖77 Citing existing case law (Rolex, Navarro Correas,
and Axoft), the court concluded that comparative advertising is not
legally prohibited in Argentina.78
[L]egal comparative advertising, insofar as it does
not degrade nor harm with false statements the
products and services of the competition, does not
fall under the sanctions of any legal provision. On
the other hand, if this kind of advertising makes
affirmations or deceptive omissions, this kind of
conduct can be considered bad faith and incur the
generic sanction of Art. 953 of the Civil Code,
which covers acts that are considered impossible,
illegal, contrary to general customs or prohibited by
law, or that oppose the freedom of actions or
infringe the rights of a third party.79
In this specific case, the judge concluded that there was no
deceit because it was the consumer that chose the product, and
many chose the plaintiff‘s, though a slight majority chose Pepsi.
Neither the ―street‖ version nor the televised commercial contained
any content that was disparaging or libelous about Coca Cola. The
judge reiterated that good faith is presumed and bad faith must be
proven, and stated that in this case plaintiff did not prove bad
faith.80
Finally, the judge commented that the defendant brought forth
video evidence of a variety of ads that Coca Cola had used in the
United States, often comparing its product with Pepsi‘s using
comparative advertising.81 The judge noted that Coca Cola‘s own
77

Coca Cola IV.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. These included commercials which showed Pepsi cans that were disintegrating
and referred to Pepsi products sarcastically, alluding to their ―sweet taste.‖ One
advertisement was set on a deserted island. A shipwrecked person saw a full bottle of
Pepsi, opened and emptied it into the ocean in order to send a message and later saw
bottles of Coca Cola arriving to the island, indicating that the person had requested Coca
Cola in his message in the bottle. Id.
78
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actions demonstrated that it did in other jurisdictions what it was
trying to prohibit in Argentina.82 Thus, under a sort of estoppel
doctrine, Coca-Cola was precluded from blocking this kind of
advertising in Argentina.
E. Procter & Gamble v. Clorox
This case examined comparative advertisements for cleaning
products. The defendant, Clorox, had started an advertising
campaign consisting of three commercials for ―Trenet,‖ a stainremoval product. Clorox‘s competitor, Procter & Gamble, stated
that the announcements made by Clorox disparaged its own
product, ―Ariel,‖ a line of laundry detergent.83 Procter & Gamble
also claimed that Clorox was using a similar format to the one it
had used when promoting its own products: collecting testimonials
from people presented as users of different cleaning products.84
However, in one of Clorox‘s commercials a consumer interviewed
declared that he would not purchase a soap when its commercial
claimed that a stain-remover would be unnecessary.85 This
statement by the consumer was a clear reference to the plaintiff‘s
detergent and Procter & Gamble urged that the ad implied that
there would be a disappointing result if its detergent were to be
used.
The case therefore considered the alleged disparaging
comments made by Clorox about Procter & Gamble‘s Ariel
detergent in Trenet‘s advertisements.86 Although it was presented
as a case of defamation, an implied comparison between products
formed the basis of the claim.87
Procter & Gamble sought to cease the broadcasting of Clorox‘s
advertisement because it disparaged the competitor by including
the opinion of a supposed consumer who stated that he would not

82

Id.
Javier F. Nuñez, La Publicidad Comparativa, ¿ Se encuentra Prohibida en nuestro
Derecho?, J.A., 2001-II-320.
84
Id.
85
Id. (It was a clear reference to the advertisement of the plaintiff, but the defendant‘s
response was that it merely said the opposite of its opponents).
86
Id.
87
Id. at § 3.
83
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buy soap that was advertised as not needing any stain-cleaner.88
The court granted the petition with respect to one of the
commercial announcements to which the plaintiff objected and
ordered the defendant to cease its broadcast.89
The court did not consider the defendant‘s intentions in
creating the commercial to be determinative or even significant—
what had to be examined was whether the advertisement could
reasonably have been construed as degrading the plaintiff‘s
products.90 The court stated that the commercial contained a clear
and specific reference to a detergent whose commercial mentioned
that by using the detergent, stain-remover would be unnecessary.
It was not, therefore, referencing just any detergent of the many
that compete in the market, but was referring to the one that used
this specific statement in its commercials. Therefore, the court
affirmed the lower court‘s decision banning the commercial.91
The decisive factor for the lower court‘s decision was the
defamatory quality of the commercial in question. To the lower
court, the commercial clearly degraded the defendant‘s product
when the interviewed person said that he would not buy detergent
which claimed not to need any stain-remover because it
specifically alluded to the unsatisfactory performance of the
defendant‘s product.92
The court dismissed the plaintiff‘s other complaints, affirming
the judge‘s decision to allow two other commercials.93 After
analyzing both of these commercials, the court concluded that: (i)
given the common nature of the so-called testimonial format, its
use by the defendant to advertise its stain-remover Trenet
constituted neither an illegal act nor an act of unfair competition;
and (ii) the mere mention of the ineffectiveness—or, at least, the

88

Id. at § 1.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal
[CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital], 4/10/2000, ―Procter & Gamble Interamericas Inc. Sucursal Aregntina y otro c.
Clorox S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-320).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
89
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lack of absolute effectiveness of the detergent‘s ability to remove
stains or dirt from clothing was insufficient to constitute
defamation. ―Day-to-day experience proves that at present there is
no soap or detergent that is perfectly capable of removing all
potential stains that a piece of clothing may have.‖94
Therefore, the other two commercials that did not specifically
reference the defendant‘s advertisement did not reach the
necessary requirements to be considered false or misleading. The
court reasoned that nothing had been said relating to the
effectiveness of Trenet; the statement that it must be used as a
complement to detergent to remove stains does not qualify as
defamation of all detergents, especially given that these other two
advertisements did not specifically reference any of the numerous
detergents in the market.‖95
F. Kimberly Clark v. Procter & Gamble
In this case, Kimberly Clark requested an injunction against
Procter & Gamble‘s ―comparative advertising campaign‖ used to
promote its sanitary pads ―Always Ultrafina con gel.‖ The
injunction was meant to order Procter & Gamble to immediately
interrupt the undertaking, broadcasting, exhibition and publication
of the advertising campaign by any means.96
The campaign consisted of placing stands in supermarkets
with: i) an exhibition of signs in gondolas and dispensers with the
phrase ―Always ultrafina con gel—6 times* cleaner and dryer‖,
clarifying later ―*vs. other soft cloth pads‖; ii) the inclusion of
stickers in packs of products; and iii) taking tests or demonstrations
with the customers of the supermarkets which compared the
promoted product with other, ―cheaper soft cloth pads,‖ with the
object of proving the alluded superiority of the product. The
campaign also included a simultaneous television commercial and
―inserts‖ in magazines and supermarket and pharmacy catalogs.
94

Id.
Id.
96
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.]
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 23/12/2003,
―Kimberly Clark Argentina S.A. c. Proctor & Gamble Argentina S.A. / derecho
industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-1).
95
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The graphic advertisements of the ―inserts‖ in magazines and
catalogs only stated: ―6 times cleaner and dryer.‖97
In both instances, the requested injunction was denied.98 The
Court of First Instance declared that (i) the competitor‘s brand was
not mentioned or alluded to in the advertisement and (ii) the
procedural requisites for granting an innovative injunction were
not met.99
When the case reached the Court of Appeals, the judges
reiterated the exceptional nature of the innovative injunction100 and
stated that, following the doctrine established by the Navarro
Correas case and its progeny,101 one must distinguish between
different uses of one‘s trademark.
[U]se without authorization of someone else‘s
trademark as if it were one‘s own from the mere
allusion or mention of the trademark while using
another, owned brand; while in the first situation
there would be an infringement of trademark law,
the second situation would depend on the
circumstances of each case, since the reference to a
trademark owned by another can be considered a
legitimate action as long as it is recognized to be
owned by another and the aim is not to disparage or
discredit it.102

97

Id. at § 5.
Id. at § 1.
99
Id.
100
Id. at § 2. (―Innovative injunctions, given their special nature, require, in addition to
the basic requisites for all injunctions, a fourth requisite, unique to this type, which
consists of the possibility of an irreparable damage.‖).
101
See Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.]
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 30/12/1993,
―Axoft Argentina S.A. c. Megasistemas S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1994C-8) (Arg.); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.]
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 22/03/1991,
―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S.A. c. Agro Industrias Cartellone S.A.‖ L.L.
1994-C-8 (Arg.) (noting the similar opinion of Judge Perez Delgado found in both cases).
102
See Navarro Correas, at § XXI.
98
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For the court, this advertising campaign did not use someone else‘s
trademark, nor was one mentioned or referenced.103
The court concluded that no comparisons with a competitor‘s
product had taken place to justify analyzing the existence of illegal
comparative advertising.104 Regarding the graphic advertisement
in the ―inserts‖ in magazines and catalogs indicating ―6 times
cleaner and dryer,‖ the court determined that ―such a phrase could
at first glance be perfectly understood to be referring to the launch
of a new ―Always ultrafina with gel‖; in other words, the new
―Always‖ is six times more absorbent than the previous model of
the same brand, but not necessarily any other product.105
Regarding the asterisk leading to the phrase ―vs. other soft cloth
pads‖ inserted in the bottom part of the advertisement in small
writing, the court declared:
The phrase occupies a sufficiently minimal space in
the design of the advertisement, in such a manner
that it is, practically, not visible. As a matter of
fact, it took a while for the members of this court to
locate it, since it went unnoticed when read in the
natural manner of flipping through these types of
magazines presented as evidence.106
The same conclusion was reached with regard to exhibiting
signs in gondolas and ―dispensers‖ with the same phrase. The
court referred to the photographs taken in supermarkets and
declared that it was impossible to notice the phrase ―*vs. other soft
cloth pads‖ (which also appears in the supermarket stands).107
Moreover, the court stressed two factors: (i) none of the products
used by the promoters of ―Always‖ for the comparison were
owned by the plaintiff‘s company; and (ii) the promoters made no
references to Kimberly-Clark‘s trademarks.108

103
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
See Kimberly Clark, at § 9.
Id. at § 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 6.
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As for the television commercial, the court concluded that the
segment of the ad including the product comparison ―demo‖ with
another sanitary pad lasted only six or seven seconds, making
reading all the text that appeared on screen impossible.109 The
court noted that there was a simultaneous voice off screen,
followed by images that evidently distracted the consumer‘s
attention.110 The court again focused on the lack of express
reference made to the competitor in the television commercial:
[T]he advertisement doesn‘t announce that the
―Always‖ product absorbs 6 times better than the
competitor‘s sanitary pads, but that it ―absorbs 6
times more than you need to feel clean and dry.‖ At
no point in time, therefore, is there a specific or
hidden mention of the products of the petitioner of
the injunction.111
The court also rejected the claim that the statement made in the
advertisement relating to the ―six times better‖ absorption power
could be considered deceitful. For the court, the determination of
this fact, with the intent to prohibit the right of the defendant to
advertise its products, clearly exceeded the limited scope of the
injunction.112 Hypothetically, the court added that the comparison
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
Id. The Court of Appeals clarified that:
[T]he mention of ―other soft cloth sanitary pads‖ in the different
forms of advertising are so marginal that not only does it not hold up
in a valid manner that we are dealing with a case of degrading and
misleading comparative advertising, but that it is difficult to establish
a concrete comparison that indeed are not done specifically with the
products or trademarks of the plaintiff. Under these conditions, the
Court considers that the challenged advertisement does not intend to
degrade nor discredit the plaintiff‘s trademarks.

Id.
112

Id. at § 8. The plaintiff brought a report made by a technical consultant to the court,
which was made using techniques and materials provided by the plaintiff. Following the
doctrine established in previous cases, the Court concluded that:
[T]he pretense of trying to prohibit an advertisement on the basis of
an alleged deceit to the consumers is inadmissible, especially
considering it is based on a report made by an expert out of reach of
the defendant and that the defendant was not even heard in court on
the matter.‖
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between products would exist if, beyond their distinct
characteristics, they satisfied the same needs and had the same
objective.113 The court cited art. 3bis of the then Council Directive
84/450/EEC, modified by Directive 97/55/EC,114 as an illustrative
source for this affirmation. The ruling concluded with a summary
of the jurisprudence on comparative advertising.115
G. Quilmes v. Isenbeck
This case concerned two beer manufacturers: Quilmes, with an
80% share in the beer market in Argentina, and Isenbeck, with
approximately only a 7% market share.116 In May 2004, one
month before the Soccer World Cup, Isenbeck started a campaign
of graphic and television ads, taking advantage of the fact that
Quilmes was the official sponsor of the Argentine National soccer
team but had just agreed to sell part of its holding company to the
Brazilian consortium manufacturer of Brahma beer.117

Id.
113

Id.
Directive 97/55/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October
1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC Concerning Misleading Advertising so as to
Include Comparative Advertising, 1997 O.J. (L 290)
115
Id. at § 9.
116
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2005, ―Cervecería y Maltería Quilmes v. Casa Isenbeck‖
(Quilmes III), Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA] (2005 III 365).
117
Id.
114
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In the campaign, Isenbeck offered one of their own bottles for free
in exchange for two bottle caps, one of their own beer and one of
their competitor‘s, Quilmes.118 The special offer was accompanied
by television ads that asked consumers to try both beers and
compare the quality of the products. The television and magazine
ads kept changing on a weekly basis due to the injunctions
Quilmes was obtaining.119
Quilmes obtained two injunctions over a period of several
weeks.120 The first one ordered the removal of all advertisements
in which Quilmes was mentioned in any way.121 The court decided
that the defendant lacked authorization by Quilmes to use the
trademark in the questioned advertisement.122 The injunction was
based directly on art. 10bis of the Paris Convention, because
international treaties have direct effect in Argentina.123 In response
to the injuction, Isenbeck decided to maintain its campaign (the
exchange of a Quilmes bottle cap for a bottle of its own beer) and
the advertisements with a slight change: Isenbeck replaced its
competitor‘s name with a beep sound, in order to avoid using the
trademark ―Quilmes‖ in its advertisement.124 In addition, Isenbeck
aired some new advertisements.125
Responding to the slight change, Quilmes obtained a second
injunction from a different judge. This one stated that the
defendant had continued to use the Quilmes trademark in the
advertisement on its website and that the mere substitution of the
trademark with a sound (the beep) was inappropriate, given that
118

Id.
The complete TV ads can be seen at youtube.com by searching for the following:
―Quilmes Isenbeck.‖
120
The two rulings were: Juzgado Nacional de 1a Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial
Federal Nro. 6 [National Court of First Instance in the Civil and Federal Commercial
Jurisdiction, number 6], 8/6/2004, ―Cerveceria y Malteria Quilmes S.A. c. C.A.S.A.
Isenbeck‖ (Quilmes I), La Ley [L.L.] (2004-D-378) (Arg.); and Juzgado Nacional de 1a
Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial Federal Nro. 8 [National Court of First Instance in the
Civil and Federal Commercial jurisdiction, number 8], 16/6/2004, ―Cervceria y Malteria
Quilmes, Inc. c. C.A.S.A. Isenbeck‖ (Quilmes II), La Ley [L.L.] (2004-D, 657) (Arg.).
121
Quilmes I.
122
Id.
123
Art. 75.22, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
124
Quilmes II.
125
Id.
119
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the public already associated the brand with the commercial.126
However, the Court declined to fine Isenbeck for not respecting the
previous injunction, because no disciplinary measure or monetary
fine was imposed in the first injunction in case of a failure to
comply.127
Both parties appealed and the Court of Appeals issued an
extensive ruling.128 There were three main issues decided in this
case. The first is related to the freedom of commercial expression
and prior censorship. The second refers to the existing limits to the
use of another owner‘s trademark, a central theme in all the cases
of comparative advertising. The third details the normative
guidelines drawn by the court to determine its legality or illegality.
The court referred to the holding in the Navarro Correas case,
considering it the starting point to determine whether legal
comparative advertising exists.129
Regarding the freedom of expression, the court concluded that
there was no conflict with prior censorship because the commercial
had already aired and therefore nothing was prohibited
beforehand.130 However, the order imposed by the Court of First
Instance was very broad as it prohibited future actions without
analyzing these future commercials.131 Based on a prior
comparative advertising case, the court would not allow an
extension of the injunction because it would have constituted prior
censorship.132
Finally, regarding the guidelines used to judge comparative
advertising, the court summarized previous cases and maintained
that: (i) advertisements with commercial disparagement of
competitors are inadmissible; (ii) advertisements containing
126

Id.
Id.
128
Quilmes III.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal,
sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2001, ―Japan Tobacco Inc. y otro c. Massalin Particulares
S.A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (2001-E-596) (Arg.) (resolving a similar issue regarding the limits
of the injunction).
127
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falsehoods and showing bad faith are inadmissible; (iii)
advertisements must compare, in an objective manner, one or more
essential, pertinent, and verifiable characteristics that represent
those goods and services; and (iv) there can be no room for
confusion in the market between an advertiser and a competitor, or
between trademarks, commercial names, other distinctive symbols,
or the goods and services of the advertiser and those of any
competitor.133 The judges expressly justified this last statement by
quoting the European Union Directive on comparative
advertising.134
The Quilmes case was also litigated in criminal court. Quilmes
filed a criminal complaint based on trademark infringement and
unfair competition. The criminal judges in both instances, citing
jurisprudence from the civil and commercial courts (especially
Navarro Correas), maintained that one should distinguish between
the use of another person‘s trademark as one‘s own and the mere
reference (or use) of another person‘s trademark, and that the
investigated conduct did not constitute a felony.135 The felony
charge provided in art. 31 of the Trademark Law was denied on the
grounds that trademark use as defined in the statute had to be
fraudulent (with the intent to deceive), an element not present in
this case.
Finally, due to the new advertisements that Quilmes argued
violated the injunctions, a criminal complaint was also filed
alleging the felony of disobedience of a judicial order. The court
dismissed the complaint,136 holding:
[W]hile it is true that the injunction was disobeyed
in order to continue the advertisements, the actions
that were taken were an exercise of the right to
freedom of expression provided in art. 14 of the
133

Quilmes III.
Id. (citing Directive 97/55/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC Concerning Misleading Advertising so as
to Include Comparative Advertising, 1997 O.J. (L 290)).
135
See Unfair Competition and Its Judicial Control, in AD HOC 333–48 (Eduardo
Favier Dubois & Guillermina Tajan eds., 2008) (containing the complete texts of the
criminal cases discussed here).
136
Id.
134
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National Constitution and art. 13 of the American
Convention of Human Rights. For this reason,
granting the injunction would imply a state action of
prior censorship since the prohibitive order would
condition the exercise of the right by the party
affected by the injunction.137
H. Los Cipreses v. Lumary
Los Cipreses S.A., a transportation company, sued Lumary
S.A. for violating its trademark in a radio advertisement. Until
Lumary entered the market, Los Cipreses was the only company
offering passenger transportation across the River Plate between
Argentina and Uruguay138 under the trademark ―Buquebus.‖ The
radio commercial featured the following conversation between an
employee and a passenger:
E: ―Attention, we would like to inform you that the
boat has been delayed again.‖
P: ―Again . . . Listen, we‘ve been here since 7:30 in
the morning, I can‘t believe this!‖
E: ―Look ma‘am, the ticket says it very clearly: the
boat can be delayed 74 days without detriment to
the company.‖
P: ―You know what . . . One day this monopoly of
yours will end!‖
E: ―Oh . . . Our monopoly will end (sound of
laughter). . . Let‘s see, wait a moment while I put
you on speaker. Carlos, listen to this . . . Let‘s see,
ma‘am, repeat that please, go on.‖
This conversation was followed by the voice of a commentator
who announced: ―Meet Colonia Express, a new high speed service
to Uruguay aboard the most modern catamaran on the River Plate.
Duty Free, Lounge bar and, most innovative of all, good customer
service, because when we compete, you end up winning.‖

137

Id.
Argentina and Uruguay are separated by the River Plate. See ERIN MCCLOSKEY,
ARGENTINA 10 (2011).
138
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The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition for an
injunction, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
granted an injunction prohibiting the commercial.139
The judge in the Court of First Instance stated that the right to
an injunction must be evident from the material contained in the
records of the case file.140 As a result, the lower court judge
decided that, since the advertisement in question did not mention
the name of the plaintiff‘s company, an injunction should not be
granted.141
Following the doctrine established in the Quilmes case, the
Court of Appeals determined that the grant of an injunction in
these cases does not imply ―prior censorship.‖142 Next, the Court
reviewed the previous opinions in comparative advertising
litigation to summarize the jurisprudential position.143
The judges held that even though the trademark ―Buquebus‖
was not specifically mentioned, the advertisement was clearly
referring to it, as it was the only public transport operator existing
between the City of Buenos Aires and Colonia, Uruguay.
Therefore, it was plausible to infer that, upon hearing the
advertisement, the general public would make the association with
―Buquebus.‖144
Finally, the court noted that the advertisement in question was
set in a ―Buquebus‖ office, where employees of the company
mocked and mistreated a hypothetical passenger.145 The court
concluded:

139

Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal
[CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
District], 26/6/2007, ―Los Cipreses S.A., c. Lumary S.A. / medidas cautelares,‖
Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2007-III-267).
140
See id. at ¶ 1.
141
Further, the judge took into account the fact that the report of the naval expertwitness regarding the characteristics of the defendant‘s catamaran could not be
considered in proving the falsehood of the affirmation ―the most modern catamaran on
the River Plate.‖ See id.
142
See id. at ¶ 5.
143
See id. at ¶¶ 5–6.
144
See id. at ¶ 8.
145
Id.
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[I]t is reasonable to infer the association the
consumers would make with the plaintiff and,
consequently, between this and the inconsiderate
treatment of the client—with the unfortunate
implications that derive from it—the act is prone to
be detrimental to the legitimate rights of the owner
of the referenced trademark—which turns out to be
those of the unequivocally identifiable competitor—
by trying to discredit it. Consequently, the
conclusion
must
be
reached
that
said
advertisement—at first glance—does not satisfy the
ethical standard included in art. 953 of the Civil
Code
and
also
violates—through
unfair
competition—art. 10 of the Paris Convention . . .
and therefore does not constitute a legitimate
activity.146
I. Laboratorios Bagó v. Bristol Myers Squibb
In an advertising campaign for certain medicinal products
created with the drug enalapril, the pharmaceutical company
Bristol Myers Squibb produced a pamphlet exclusively for doctors
that included comparisons between its prices and those of other
brands.147 The pamphlet also stated that ―Unlike those that charge
you anything . . . Versalion charges fairly‖ and that the product
Kinfil was ―the best enalapril.‖148
The price comparison included a product belonging to Bagó
Laboratories (Glioten, also created with the drug enalapril).149
Bagó filed a claim requesting a cessation of the use of its
trademark, contending that this form of comparative advertising

146

Id.
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
2 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 2], 27/3/2009, ―Laboratorios Bagó S.A. c. Bristol Myers Squibb
Argentina S.R.L.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (20357/2009), at section I.
148
Id.
149
Id.
147
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was illegal because it exceeded the limits established by the
ANMAT150 for the circulation of its products amongst doctors.151
The judge of the Court of First Instance determined that no
prohibition included in ANMAT Regulation 4980/2005 had been
violated and declared the claim unfounded, dismissed it and
imposed court costs.152 The Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision.153
The Court of Appeals based its ruling on the following: (i) the
defendant‘s promotional pamphlets were distributed exclusively to
doctors (so no confusion could be inferred);154 (ii) a phrase as
general as ―the most convenient enalapril‖ does not degrade or
constitute an act of unfair competition;155 (iii) comparative
advertising does not abide by the trademark regime, ―. . . but if the
manner in which it is done respects commercial loyalty and does
not cause a legitimate prejudice to a third party, it is hard to find a
reason that could prevent its use (as long as it does not imply
taking advantage of another person‘s trademark, without
authorization) . . .‖; 156 (iv) the fact that the defendant‘s
advertisement includes a price comparison (mentioning the prices
of each trademark) ―constitutes an informational resource that does
not deserve reproach since the information included is objective
and exact . . .‖;157 (v) supplying a table that contains a list of four
products, with their market prices, and including one‘s own

150

The ANMAT (National Administration, Medicine, Foods and Medicinal
Technology) is the entity that regulates pharmaceutical and food products.
151
Id. at 152 (since it was dealing with products sold with a prescription, the only
advertising that is allowed is the one distributed to physicians, through the visiting
doctors).
152
Laboratorios Bagó, at § II.
153
Id. at § III.
154
Id.
155
Id. at § IV.
156
This was the opinion by Judge Vocos Conesa, writing for the majoirty (―In general
terms, I am not an advocate of authorizing ‗comparative advertising,‘ because experience
dictates that, factually, it is common to use this procedure to praise the benefits of one
product by taking advantage of the prestige of another. It is very rare—I have never seen
it—that a prestigious and well known trademark product would fall back on this method
because, truthfully, it wouldn‘t need to.‖). This is, however, a pretty absolute statement
(which he later tempers) given the open evolution of comparative advertising. Id.
157
Id. at section V.
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product, with its brand name and price, in no way violates the rules
of the Trademark Law;158 and (vi) neither advertising technique
constitutes excessive or abusive conduct that contravened the
ANMAT regulations.159
J. Kimberly Clark v. Topsy (Procter & Gamble)
This case dealt with a campaign carried out in 1998 and 1999
by a baby diaper manufacturer. The campaign consisted of a live
comparison of the absorption capabilities and longevity of its
product (―Pampers Extra Sec‖) with those of the competition in
stands placed in supermarkets.160 In the demonstration, a diaper of
the promoting company and one of the supposed competitor (even
though the brand name was not shown) was used.161 A blue liquid
was poured on them to show the absorption and baby skinprotecting power, drawing attention to the fact that the diaper of
the advertiser featured a patented substance called ―dermacrem‖
that other diapers did not have.162 Kimberly-Clark, manufacturer
of the ―Huggies Mimito Ultratrim‖ diaper, sued Topsy (later, also
Procter & Gamble) and the advertising agency for illegal
comparative advertising.163
In both instances the claim was denied.164 The judge in the
Court of First instance determined that the plaintiff lacked standing
to act because it was not the registered owner of the trademark
―Huggies.‖ The judge added—following the Navarro Correas
holding—that there had not been a use of another owner‘s brand as
one‘s own, no deceptive acts towards the general public, and no
actions that disparaged the product identified with the brand

158

Id.
Id.
160
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 24/09/2009, ―Kimberly Clark Argentina S.A. c. Topsy S.A. y otro
/ cese de uso de marcas‖ (Topsy II), (6042/1999) (Arg.).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.; Juzcado Nacional de Primera Instancia, no. 9, secretary 18 [1a Inst.], 9/10/2008,
―Kimberly Clark Argentina Inc., c. Topsy Inc‖ (Topsy I) (Arg.).
159
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―Mimito.‖165 In his conclusions, the judge cited previous local
comparative advertising cases and specifically mentioned
European Directive 97/55/CE on comparative advertising to
establish the legal framework applicable to the case.166 Finally, the
judge stated that the damages the plaintiff claimed to have
suffered, such as deception of clientele and lost prestige to the
brand image, had not been proven.167
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court‘s decision.168
The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had standing because the
appeal was grounded not only on the use of the trademark but also
on illegal comparative advertising, which allows compensation for
damages caused by an ―act of unfair competition‖ and that does
not require the ownership of the trademark.169 However, regarding
the question of law, the court noted that the campaign was
designed without the clear identification of a specific competitor
(the trademark of the diapers had been covered with black adhesive
tape and no brand name was ever shown to the consuming
public).170
The ruling resembles the holding of the Navarro Correas case,
which clarified that advertisements are illegal when a lack of fair
trade is present, when the advertisement has been proven to
contain a falsehood, or when it can be misleading. None of these
situations were present in this case.171 Furthermore, the court
specifically highlighted the fact that the experts demonstrated that
the affirmations made by the defendant were true: the Pampers
diaper contained an emollient substance that other products
lacked.172 Finally, the court alluded to the fact that it could not

165

Id.
Id.
167
Id.
168
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 24/09/2009, Topsy II, (6042/1999) (Arg.).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
166
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prove the deception of clientele in a manner that could be
considered illegal.173
K. The Gillette Company v. Energizer
This case concerned two battery manufacturers—Duracell and
Energizer.174 The advertisement published in major magazines
depicted a group of six fantastical rabbits on one side—some of
which were lying around, looking defeated—and on the other side,
a battery with arms, legs, and the brand name ―Energizer,‖ which
apparently won the tug-of-war competition between the rabbits and
the personified battery. At the upper part of the ad, a statement
read: ―Energizer. Lithium up to 6 times longer than Duracell‖ and,
underneath that, in smaller writing, clearer and centered it
continued: ―common in digital cameras.‖175

173

Id.
Similar battles between battery manufacturers have taken place in other parts of the
world with different outcomes. See Energizer Holdings, Inc., v. Duracell, No. 01 C 9720,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9313 at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2002); Gillette Austl. Pty. Ltd. v
Energizer Austl. Pty. Ltd. [2005] FCA 1647 (Austl.); Energizer N.Z. Ltd. v Panasonic
N.Z. Ltd. (unreported) High Court, CIV-2009-404-4087, 16 November 2009, Allan J
(N.Z.).
175
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital,
courtroom 1], 26/03/2009, ―Gillette Co. c. Energizar Arg. S.A. / incidente de apelación de
medida cautelar‖ (Gillette II), [IJ-XXXIII-484, at 7] (Arg.).
174
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Duracell was granted an injunction which was later affirmed.176
In granting the injunction, the Court of First Instance noted that the
conduct of the defendant appeared to be ―at odds with elemental
moral laws of society.‖177
The Court of Appeals held that the challenged advertisement
could possibly injure the legitimate rights of the owner of the
trademark by trying to create the idea that the product of the
defendant is superior, based on an ―unacceptable‖ comparison (the
allegory that the character of the plaintiff is defeated and that the
batteries of the competitor ―last longer‖), so that the consumer
cannot choose in a fully informed fashion.178 It also restated that a
specific advertising strategy is the manifestation of freedom of
expression and is granted constitutional protection, although this
protection does not exempt those that develop advertising
campaigns from complying with trademark law and fair trade
laws.179 However, the court noted that comparative advertising is
not considered illegal as long as (i) it does not injure the legitimate
rights of the owner of the trademark it is referencing; (ii) the
advertisement does not disparage or discredit the competitor‘s
trademark; or (iii) it does not mislead the consumer.180
Regarding this case, the court clarified that the use of small
writing did not function as a disclaimer related to the main phrase
of the ad (which refers to the idea that the battery lasts six times
longer than the plaintiff‘s) and concluded that ―from the
challenged ad there emerged no comparison with sufficient clarity
that could not refer to homogenous products, in such a manner that
the consumer can make a fully informed decision; in other words,
the resulting impression is the comparison of equivalent
176

Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia [1a Inst.] [National Court of First Instance],
16/12/2008, ―Gillette Co. c. Energiza Arg. S.A., / incidente de medida cautelar‖ (Gillette
I), [12071/2008] (Arg.), aff’d, Gillette II.
177
Gillette I.
178
Gillette II, at 7 (―In such conditions, it is possible to conclude that the publicity
objected to—in principle—is likely to injure the legitimate rights of the holder of the
mark mentioned without authorization by trying to establish the idea that its product of is
superior . . .‖).
179
Id. at 5 (―However, a particular advertising strategy is a manifestation of the
freedom of expression and gains constitutional protection.‖).
180
Id.
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products.‖181 The court found support for its conclusions in
European laws about misleading commercial publicity.182 The
court also noted that ―Energito‖ is an emblematic character of the
defendant‘s trademark and easily recognizable by the consumers
that are the targets of the advertisement.183
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINE CASE LAW
A comparison of the cases from the 1970s with more recent
cases shows that the Argentine courts have been leaving behind a
formerly strict criterion of Trademark Law that prohibited the use
of someone else‘s trademark, and are instead choosing to lean
more strongly on principles of unfair competition. This evolution
demonstrates how the principles of European Union Law and the
EU Directive that specifically regulates the subject matter have
begun to filter into judicial decisions;184 the last five cases
specifically cite European Community Law.185
Of the seventeen resolved cases in Argentine jurisprudence,
only eight were trials that ended with firm rulings on the question

181

The Court specified that:
[T]he integral observation of the described advertisement shows that
the clearly dominant portion of the text mentioned is in the forefront,
given the typography, size and placement. In effect, contrary to what
is maintained by the appellant, in terms of the general consumer—to
whom the advertisement is obviously targeted—what is of smaller
size and highlighted less acquires less importance.
Id. at 7.
182
Id. (―Consequently, the notice in question does not provide sufficient clarity that the
comparison is not between homogenous products such that the consumer can make a
fully informed choice.‖).
183
Id.. Unlike their American campaigns, in Argentina Energizer uses a humanized
battery as a mascot, while Duracell uses a pink bunny as a mascot.
184
The sources of these judicial rules are art. 10 of the Paris Convention, art. 953 of the
Civil Code, and art. 3bis of the European Directive on Comparative Advertising.
185
In addition to citing the Directive on Comparative Advertising in some cases, a
reference has been also made to the then draft Directive on unfair commercial practices.
This Directive was finally approved in the year 2005 and does not specifically deal with
comparative advertising, but does deal with deceptive trade practices. See EU DIRECTIVE
2005/29/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, Of Journal. 11.6.2005.

2012]

COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING IN ARGENTINA

693

of law.186 Of those eight cases, six denied the existence of any
illegal activity and only two ruled that there had been an abuse, by
degrading the competitor (Axoft v. Megasistemas) or because the
advertisement simply did not pass the ethical standard contained in
art. 953 of the Civil Code and the rules about fair trade or unfair
competition (Rolex v. Orient). Of the injunction cases, nine
prohibited comparative advertisements, but three of these were
overruled on appeal.187
All of the cases depart from the clear distinction established in
Navarro Correas between the mere reference (or descriptive use)
of another person‘s trademark and the use of a competitor‘s
trademark that infringes trademark law. In some way, the Navarro
Correas decision validates the use of distinguishing signs and
symbols of a competitor, as long as it does not violate trademark
law, achieving the effect that in practice the limits of said uses are
imposed by the unfair competition regulations: prohibiting
defamatory, disloyal, subjective, and bad faith uses.
The rulings after the Navarro Correas case went on to specify
and determine when these requirements were met. In this manner,
Argentine jurisprudence—due to lack of written law—has over
time been creating and applying rules about unfair competition to
regulate comparative advertising.
The rules established by the Courts can be summarized in the
following manner:
1. Comparative advertising is not illegal. The mere act of
using another person‘s trademark is not illegal per se if it is
referenced as the trademark of said person.188
186
The others only dealt with the issue of injunctions. It is difficult to compare
injunctive rulings with final rulings on the merits, because the legal analysis is richer in
cases that reach the merits.
187
In Coca Cola v. Pepsi, this was for procedural reasons, so the Surpreme Court did
not reach the merits. Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la
Capital Federal, sala II [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 2], 22/10/93, ―Coca Cola I‖, La Ley [L.L.]
(1994-C-3) (Arg.).
188
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 23/3/1991, ―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S. A. c. Agro
Industrias Cartellone S. A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1991-C-531) (Arg.).
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2. The trademark must be clearly mentioned in the
advertisement to be illegal. If the competitor‘s trademark doesn‘t
appear mentioned, then there is, in principle, no comparative
advertising.189
3. The fleeting appearance of a trademark in a commercial
would not imply a trademark use.190
4. In some cases the reference to a competitor can be inferred
when there is no doubt as to the identity of the competitor in the
market, because it is a notorious fact or by a suggestive mention
made in the commercial or in its context.191
189

Navarro Correas; Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Penal Económico de la
Capital Federal, sala A [CNPenal Económico] [National Court of Economic Criminal
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom A], 13/04/2011, ―Grupo Bimbo Sociedad
Anonima de Capital Variable S.A. y Compañía de Alimentos Fargo S.A. s/ Infraccíon a
La Ley 25.156,‖ (Causa No. 61.184 Folio No. 012 Orden No. 26.993) (Arg.); Cámara
Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital,
courtroom 1], 13/6/1996, ―Demibell S.A. c. Deville S.R.L.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1997-B-67)
(Arg.); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal,
sala 3 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 3], 27/9/2000, ―Clorox Argentina S.A. c. Unilever de Argentina
S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-327); Juzcado Nacional de Primera
Instancia, no. 9, secretary 18 [1a Inst.], 9/10/2008, ―Topsy I‖ (Arg.); Cámara Nacional de
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.]
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1],
30/06/2005, ―Clorox Argentina S.A. c. Reckitt Benckiser Argentina S.A. s/medidas
cautelares‖ Citar Lexis (7/15825); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y
Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the
Federal Capital], 23/12/2003, ―Kimberly Clark Argentina S.A. c. Proctor & Gamble
Argentina S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-1).
190
Navarro Correas; Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la
Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 19/04/2001, ―Gougenheim S.A. c. Bimbo
de Argentina S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-469).
191
Coca Cola v. Pepsi (presumption that the covered up bottle in Pepsi‘s commercial
was Coca Cola‘s); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital
Federal, sala 2 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the
Federal Capital, courtroom 2], 24/02/2000, ―Unilever de Argentina S.A. c. Procter &
Gamble Interamericas Inc.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-318) (reference
made to a bar of soap unique in the market); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil
y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and
Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2001, ―Japan Tobacco
Inc. y otro c. Massalin Particulares S.A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (2001-E-596) (Arg.) (emerging
from a previous advertisement and the content to which the competitor‘s advertisement
refers); Los Cipreses v. Lumary (Buquebus was the sole competitor with ferries crossing
the River Plate); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital
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5. What the law forbids is the use of a third party’s brand as if
it was one’s own, but it does not prohibit use in order to compare
products.192
6. An advertisement must not try to disparage or discredit the
trademark of a competitor, be deceitful, or spread or allow the
inference of falsehoods.193
7. There is no defamation in phrases that make general or true
statements or actions in which the consumer chooses.194

Federal [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the
Federal Capital], 4/10/2000, ―Procter & Gamble Interamericas Inc. Sucursal Aregntina y
otro c. Clorox S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-320)
(an interviewed consumer made a reference to no longer buying the detergent which he
specified by its unique advertisement); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y
Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and
Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2005, ―Quilmes III‖,
Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA] (2005 III 365) (replacing the brand ―Quilmes‖ with a
―beep‖ in the commercial is insufficient); Gillete v. Energizer (the rabbits in the
commercial represented the well known Duracell mascot).
192
Navarro Correas.
193
Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital,
courtroom 1], 30/12/1993, ―Axoft Argentina Inc. c. Megasistemas, Inc.,‖ La Ley [L.L.]
(1994-C-8) (Arg.) (comparing only certain characteristics and fraudulently omitting
others of the plaintiff‘s software that the defendant knew due to being its previous
distributor for several years); Procter & Gamble v. Clorox (an interviewed consumer
stated in an advertisement that purchasing the soap whose ads say it will be unnecessary
to use stain removers will no longer be required); Quilmes v. Isenbeck (a reference to the
idea that the competitor‘s beer is not 100% beer); Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia
[1a Inst.] [National Court of First Instance], 16/12/2008, ―Gillette I‖, [12071/2008]
(Arg.), aff’d, Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1
[CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal
Capital, courtroom 1], 26/03/2009, ―Gillette II‖, [IJ-XXXIII-484, at 7] (Arg.) (the mascot
of the defendant appears defeated by the rabbits of the plaintiff).
194
Demibel v. Deville (famous model states in a new commercial that she now uses a
new brand of underwear after being the competition‘s model for several years); Coca
Cola v. Pepsi (consumers taste drinks in street stands and then share the results); Procter
& Gamble v. Clorox (the mere mention of the insufficiency of the soaps or detergents to
remove stains is not degrading); Gougenheim v. Bimbo (saying ―Bimbo is very fresh‖ is
not degrading to ―Fargo, the bread of day‖); Japan Tobacco v. Massalin (saying that the
plaintiff‘s product is from a specific country is not defamatory); Cámara Nacional de
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 2 [CNCiv. y Com.]
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 2],
27/3/2009, ―Laboratorios Bagó S.A. c. Bristol Myers Squibb Argentina S.R.L.,‖
Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (20357/2009) (reference included in a pamphlet to ―the
best,‖ ―the most convenient enalapril,‖ ―the number one,‖ is not degrading to the
competitor‘s product, just as comparing prices is not illegal).
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8. Only when there is bad faith is comparative advertising
illegitimate, but to prove bad faith a falsehood must be accredited
in the advertisement.
9. In addition, the confrontation must be between homogenous
products and characteristics, while also being true and fair, which
requires that it be executed in equal conditions for all products
subjected to the comparison.
10. The advertisement has to objectively compare one or more
essential, pertinent, and verifiable characteristics that represent
those goods and services. There can be no room for confusion in
the market between the advertiser and a competitor; or between
trademarks, trade names, or other distinguishable symbols or signs;
or between the goods and services of the advertiser and those of a
competitor.195
CONCLUSION
In Argentina, there are clear jurisprudential rules based on
unfair competition law. If in some manner an advertisement is
proven to be unfair or exceeds ethical standards by hiding the truth
or omitting some essential aspect of the comparison, it is probable
that an injunction will be granted and that the plaintiff will be able
to obtain a final decision declaring the advertisement illegal.
By following the requirements of the European Union
Directive on comparative advertising and other international
precedent, Argentine courts have developed standards very similar
to European regulation. The judges seemingly wished to validate
the judicially-created rules with some external source of codified
law. The general holdings of the Argentine courts are consistent
with similar conclusions reached elsewhere indicating the
existence of a universally accepted principle that comparing
products in commercial advertisements should be lawful.

195

See Council Directive 97/55, 1997 O.J. (L 290) (EC).

